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INTRODUCTION
Frédéric Bastiat (1801-1850) was a French journalist, economist, and pamphleteer. Several authors have written biographies about his life and work. 1 Mülberger devoted a full volume to his debate with Proudhon about the justification for interest.
2
Although not as frequently cited in the economics literature as some other economists of the period, his writings have lived on and have stood the test of time.
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British Corn Law League-and engaged in detailed correspondence with them.
12
His contributions to the economics literature have been sufficient for him to earn a place in Mark Blaug's Great Economists before Keynes.
13
Robert Heilbroner devotes a major portion of a chapter to Bastiat in his classic book The Worldly Philosophers, first published in 1953 and used in economics classrooms ever since.
14 Rothbard devotes nine pages to Bastiat in volume two of his history of economic thought 15 and credits Bastiat with refuting the Keynesian multiplier theory nearly 100 years before it was advanced by Keynes. 16 Skousen spends seven pages discussing Bastiat in his history of economic thought.
17 Schumpeter referred to him as a "brilliant economic journalist." 18 Haney devotes chapter 15 of his History of Economic Thought to Bastiat. 19 A number of authors have applied Bastiat's theories and approaches to modern economic problems. Henry Hazlitt, an American economic journalist, used Bastiat's approach to examine a number of economic theories and policies in his classic Economics in One Lesson. 20 Dean Russell, an economist, also applied Bastiat's theories and approaches to a wide range of economic issues.
21
Frédéric Bastiat, L'État, reprinted in OEUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME QUATRIÈME 327-41 (3d ed. 1873) and THE BASTIAT COLLECTION, supra note 3, VOL. I, at 95-107; Frédéric Bastiat, Harmonies Économiques, reprinted in OEUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME SIXIÈME (6th ed. 1870), available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/948/0137-06_Bk_Sm.pdf; Frédéric Bastiat, Le Libre-Échange, reprinted in OEUVRES COMPLÈTES DE FRÉDÉRIC BASTIAT, TOME DEUXIÈME (2d ed. 1862) [hereinafter Bastiat, Le Libre-Échange] , available at http://files.libertyfund.org/files/944/0137-02_Bk_Sm.pdf; Bastiat, Petition, in BASTIAT, ECONOMIC SOPHISMS, supra note 10; BASTIAT, SELECTED ESSAYS, supra note 3; Frédéric Bastiat, Sophismes Économiques, Petits Pamphlets I, reprinted 24 has become a classic of the free trade literature. It has been reprinted many times in economics textbooks and in other trade publications.
25
The Petition was instigated in response to the French Chamber of Deputies, which passed legislation that increased duties on all foreign products; a measure they thought would benefit French industry. 26 It begins as follows:
You are on the right track. You reject abstract theories and have little regard for abundance and low prices. You concern yourselves mainly with the fate of the producer. You wish to free him from foreign competition, that is, to reserve the domestic market for domestic industry.
We come to offer you a wonderful opportunity for applying yourwhat shall we call it? Your theory? No, nothing is more deceptive than theory. Your doctrine? Your system? Your principle? But you dislike doctrines, you have a horror of systems, and, as for principles, you deny that there are any in political economy; therefore we shall call it your practice-your practice without theory and without principle.
27
The Petition goes on to complain about the suffering French producers are incurring as a result of a foreign competitor "who . . . works under conditions [that are] so far superior to" those of the French manufacturers that they are unable to compete. 28 This competitor is flooding the French market with light at such an "incredibly low price" that French producers of light such as candle makers, makers of lanterns, street lamps, and the 22. Bastiat He goes on to explain the benefits of passing such a law. Shutting off as much natural light as possible creates a need for artificial light, which would encourage a wide range of French industry. 31 In order to consume more tallow it would be necessary to have more cattle and sheep, which would require more cleared fields, leather, wool, meat and manure, which is the basis of all French agricultural wealth.
32
But that is not the end of the story. If the French consume more oil it would be necessary to expand cultivation of several agricultural products, including the olive, rapeseed and the poppy. 33 The fact that these plants exhaust the soil would not be a problem because the increased breeding of cattle would result in the production of more manure to fertilize the fields where these items are being grown.
34
French moors would be "covered with resinous trees."
35 French mountains would be swarming with bees. 36 All sectors of agriculture would vastly expand.
The shipping industry would also expand. 37 Thousands of French vessels would be employed by the whaling industry, to the glory of France. The Parisian manufacturing sector would also prosper. One would soon see gilding, bronze and crystal in lamps, candle sticks, chandeliers and candelabra. There will not be a resin collector or miner who will not enjoy increased wages and prosperity. There is not one Frenchman, from the wealthy stockbroker to the humblest match vendor whose condition would not be improved by outlawing the sun.
Bastiat goes on to address the objections that the French Chamber of Deputies might raise and responds to them. One might object that, although French industry may benefit from protectionism, France itself will not benefit because consumers will have to pay. [Vol. 5
You no longer have the right to invoke the interests of the consumer. You have sacrificed him whenever you have found his interests opposed to those of the producer. You have done so in order to encourage industry and to increase employment. For the same reason you ought to do so this time too. 38 Bastiat points out that when the argument was made that consumers have a stake in the free importation of iron, coal, sesame, wheat and textiles, the Chamber of Deputies responded that French producers have a stake in their exclusion. Likewise, if they raise the objection that French consumers have a stake in the admission of natural light, producers have a stake in preventing consumers from obtaining it for free.
Free traders might also assert that the producer and the consumer are the same person. If manufacturers benefit from the protection, they will cause farmers to also benefit. The protection will open markets for manufactured goods. If the Chamber of Deputies would grant a daytime monopoly over the production of light, "large amounts of tallow, charcoal, resin, wax, alcohol, silver, iron, bronze, and crystal," 39 would be purchased, making those industries rich. They will consume the products of all other French industries, causing a ripple effect throughout the French economy.
He then raises another free market argument. It is precisely on the basis that the product is half free that protectionists argue it should be barred. That being the case, how can it be argued that a totally free product should be admitted into competition? Such an argument involves inconsistency. If something that is half free is harmful to French 
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Economic Protectionism 433 domestic industry, one must exclude something that is totally free with twice the zeal. Bastiat then gives another example. When a product such as iron, coal, wheat or textiles comes from abroad, enabling French consumers to obtain it for less labor than if it were produced domestically, the difference is a gratuitous gift. The size of the gift is in direct proportion to the difference in cost. The gift is as complete as it can be when the donor -the sunprovides us with light and asks for nothing in return.
The question Bastiat then poses is whether what they desire for France is the benefit to be gained by this free consumption or the alleged advantages of onerous production. He instructs them to make their choice but to be logical. Since they ban foreign iron, coal, wheat and textiles in proportion as their price approaches zero, it would be utterly inconsistent to admit sunlight, which has a price of zero all day long.
The point Bastiat was trying to make is that the arguments the Chamber of Deputies had used in the past to justify protection for other commodities were absurd when taken to their logical conclusions. Outlawing the sun, to the extent possible, would be a stupid and irrational policy, since the sun costs nothing and all of France benefits. What is less obvious is that foreign products that cost less than French products constitute partial gifts to the French people.
Bastiat uses another approach in his essay, What Is Seen and What Is Not Seen, 46 to make the same point. He argues that what is seen by protecting a wide range of French industry from competition by the sun is an increase in sales for candle makers and other industries that are involved in the artificial light industry, but what is not seen is all the business that never takes place in other industries because French consumers now have to pay for something that was formerly free. If consumers must pay more for light products, they will have less to spend on every other industry and service. All the non-light industries and service providers will suffer as a result of protecting the French artificial lighting industry.
As was mentioned, Bastiat was a vigorous advocate of free trade. He wanted to do for France what Cobden and Bright were doing for England, namely, abolishing restrictions to trade. 47 Two tools in his toolbox were ridicule and reductio ad absurdum. He also employed logic, utilitarian analysis, and, at times, rights theory to make his point. We now turn to some of his other writings on free trade.
46. Bastiat [Vol. 5
II. DIFFERENTIAL TARIFFS
In a short essay on differential tariffs, Bastiat illustrates the effect such tariffs have on the common man. 48 In the example, an impoverished French farmer who lovingly tended his vines finally raises enough grapes to make a cask of wine, which he takes to the nearest town, telling his wife that he will use the proceeds from the sale to purchase enough material for her "'to furnish a trousseau for our daughter. '" 49 When he arrives he meets a Belgian and an Englishman. The Belgian offers to give him fifteen parcels of yarn for his wine. The Englishman offers him twenty parcels, explaining that the reason he can offer more is because the English spin at lower cost than the Belgians. The farmer found that result difficult to understand. The customs official replied that he found it difficult to explain, stating only that "'it is a fact; for all our deputies, cabinet ministers, and journalists agree that the more a nation receives in exchange for a given quantity of its products, the poorer it becomes. '" 54 Because of this policy the farmer had to be content dealing with the Belgian. As a result, his daughter got only three-fourths of a trousseau and the farmer's family is still trying to figure out how a person can be ruined by receiving four parcels of yarn instead of three, and why a person is richer with three dozen towels than with four dozen.
Bastiat's example makes obvious what politicians and some economists try to obscure: that consumers are better off if they are not prevented from trading with whomever they want. Protectionists would argue that tariffs or outright bans on imports are necessary to protect French industry. But in this case there was no Frenchman present other than the farmer. There were two losers in this exchange, the Frenchman and the Englishman, and only 48. Frédéric Bastiat, Droits Différentiels, reprinted One might counter that the transaction is positive-sum, since all trade is a positive-sum game. Both parties are better off after than before the trade. Otherwise they would not have entered into the trade. That is perfectly true. Both the farmer and the Belgian are better off as a result of the trade. But the farmer is not as well off as he would have been in the absence of the legal restriction.
Which argument wins depends on how you define negative-sum game, and this is one of the problems with economic analysis. The definition sometimes determines the conclusion. Under Bastiat's definition, the Englishman was a loser, although he was not a party to the transaction. He would have been a winner if the transaction had been allowed to take place.
III. UTILITARIAN AND RIGHTS PERSPECTIVES
Regardless of how one might consider the outcome of the French farmer and Belgian merchant example from a utilitarian perspective, the outcome from a rights perspective is clear. Someone's rights have been violated; therefore, the policy is unethical.
The utilitarian and rights perspectives might be summarized by the following two flowcharts: 55. One of the basic premises of utilitarian ethics is that an act is ethical if the good exceeds the bad or if winners exceed losers, which is not quite the same thing. Utilitarian ethics is discussed below. 
See
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According to utilitarian ethics, an act or policy is ethical if the result is more winners than losers, or if the result is a positive-sum game, which is not quite the same thing. Early utilitarians 57 stated that an act or policy is good if the result is the greatest good for the greatest number, a condition that is impossible to achieve, since it is not possible to maximize two variables at the same time.
58
With respect to Bastiat's French farmer, one might conclude that the transaction meets the utilitarian ethics test because both parties to the transaction-the French farmer and the Belgian merchant-are better off as a result of the trade. While it may be argued that the Englishman has lost as a result of the trade, he is, in fact, in exactly the same position as he was before the trade. Before the transaction, he had twenty parcels and after it he has the same twenty parcels, although his rights have been violated by being prevented from entering into the trade.
But the French farmer is not as well off as he would have been if he had been allowed to trade with the Englishman instead of the Belgian. Utilitarian ethics has a problem dealing with this kind of fact situation, but it is not a totally insurmountable one. A more sophisticated approach would be to take the position that "an action is right if and only if it brings about at least as much net happiness as any other action the agent could have performed; otherwise it is wrong." 59 In other words, even if the outcome is positive, it is unethical unless it is the most positive of all possible outcomes.
Under this more holistic utilitarian perspective, the fact that the trade restriction leads to a suboptimal result makes it wrong. Bastiat's example illustrates this point without coming right out and saying it.
The second flowchart illustrates the rights position. According to this view an act or policy is inherently unethical or unjust if someone's rights are violated by it, even if the winners' gains exceed the losers' losses. For example, if two wolves and one sheep were to take a vote on what to have for lunch, a utilitarian would conclude that voting to eat the sheep was an ethical act because the winners exceeded the losers, whereas a rights theorist would conclude the act was unethical because the rights of the sheep were violated. The fact that some majority benefited is totally irrelevant.
One of the inherent flaws in utilitarian ethics is that it ignores rights. Bentham, one of the early utilitarians, would disagree, since he believes that 57. See, e.g there is no such thing as inherent rights, 60 but we will leave discussion of this issue for another day.
Bastiat addressed trade issues from a predominantly utilitarian point of view. His arguments are utilitarian in the sense that he consistently argues that free trade results in more winners than losers and that society benefits from free trade. But his philosophical outlook was not limited to utility. He was also, at times, a rights theorist. The most complete exposition of his rights position was laid out in The Law. 61 In it, Bastiat describes how the law can be perverted into a tool of legal plunder. "Under the pretense of organization, regulation, protection, or encouragement," Bastiat writes, "the law takes property from one person and gives it to another; the law takes the wealth of all and gives it to a few-whether farmers, manufacturers, shipowners, artists, or comedians." 62 Some economists call this practice rent-seeking, or using the law to feather the nests of the few (special interests) at the expense of the many. Then abolish this law without delay, for it is not only an evil itself, but also it is a fertile source for further evils because it invites reprisals. If such a law-which may be an isolated case-is not abolished immediately, it will spread, multiply, and develop into a system. 64 Bastiat applied this view in the following trade example. MAN (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1987) [hereinafter WALDRON]. "That which has no existence cannot be destroyed-that which cannot be destroyed cannot require anything to preserve it from destruction. Natural rights is simple nonsense: natural and imprescriptible rights, rhetorical nonsense,-nonsense upon stilts." Id. at 53 (quoting Bentham's famous quote is from ANARCHICAL FALLACIES (1843)). In other words, all rights come from government. Bastiat would disagree. In THE LAW, Bastiat takes the position that rights come before government. BASTIAT, THE LAW, supra note 3. Governments are formed to protect life, liberty and property. Id. Governments that limit themselves to these functions are just. Id. Governments that go beyond these functions are unjust because they use the force of government to redistribute wealth. Id. 
BASTIAT, THE LAW
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IV. RESTRAINT OF TRADE
In his essay, What is Seen and What Is Not Seen, 65 Bastiat discusses the case of an industrialist-whom he calls Mr. Protectionist-who "devote[s] his time and . . . capital to converting ore from his [property] into iron." 66 However, because nature has blessed Belgium with more natural ore than France, the Belgians are able to sell their iron for a lower price. 67 This gift from nature meant that Frenchmen in various industries such as "nailmakers, metalworkers, cartwrights, mechanics, blacksmiths, and plowmen" are prompted by their self-interest to buy their iron from Flanders rather than from domestic suppliers like Mr. Protectionist.
68
"His first [thought] was to stop this abuse . . . with his own two hands."
69 He would take his carbine, four pistols, cartridges, and a sword to the border and kill the first French tradesman he sees who attempts to buy this cheap Belgian iron. 70 It would teach them a lesson. How dare they put their own self-interest above that of Mr. Protectionist?
But as he began to leave he started having second thoughts. 71 Perhaps some of his countrymen might not allow themselves to be killed. 72 They might kill him instead. 73 Even if he took all his servants with him, they would not be able to guard the entire border.
74 Furthermore, the cost of trying to stop this trade would cost more than his entire net worth.
75
Just as he was becoming resigned to the fact that he must settle for being free like everyone else "he had a brilliant idea." 76 "He remembered that there is a great law factory in Paris" that made laws everyone must conform to "whether . . . good or bad."
77 Police are paid to enforce these laws out of the national wealth.
78 Perhaps he could get this Parisian factory to make "a nice . . . law [stating that] 'Belgian iron is prohibited.'" 79 Rather than incurring the cost of sending his few servants to the border, the State could send 20,000 sons of those tradesmen who were buying Belgian iron to act as customs officials, to be paid with the taxes extracted from those [Vol. 5 very same tradesmen. 80 It would cost Mr. Protectionist nothing; he would be protected from the brutality that might be inflicted on him if he were to try to do the job himself; and it would enable him to sell the iron at his price.
81 He would also have "the sweet pleasure of seeing . . .
[the] people shamefully hoaxed."
82
So he went to members of the legislature and presented to their excellencies the following argument: "Belgian iron is sold in France at ten francs, which forces me to sell mine at the same price. I should prefer to sell it at fifteen and cannot because of this confounded Belgian iron. Manufacture a law that says: 'Belgian iron shall no longer enter France.' Immediately I shall raise my price by five francs, with the following consequences: ". . . I shall enrich myself more quickly; I shall employ more men. . . . My employees and I will spend more, to the great advantage of our suppliers for miles around. These suppliers, having a greater market, will give more orders to industry, and gradually this activity will spread throughout the country. This lucky hundred-sou piece that you will drop into my coffers, like a stone that is thrown into a lake will cause an infinite number of concentric circles to radiate great distances in every direction."
83
His argument was an early example of the Keynesian multiplier, of course.
84 Some funds injected into one part of the economy will have a ripple effect throughout all parts of the economy, having a multiplier effect.
The legislators, seeing "that it is so easy to increase the wealth of a people simply by legislation," decided to pass the law. 85 After all, why bother to work and save when you can easily create wealth by legislative fiat?
86
In fact, the law did everything Mr. Protectionist said it would do. Unfortunately, it had other effects as well. What is seen is the prosperity of Mr. Protectionist and the people who work for him. What is not seen are the negative secondary effects that offset the gains of Mr. Protectionist and his workers.
The scenario Mr. Protectionist presented to the members of the legislature was incomplete. There are more people affected than merely himself and his workers. While it is true that the extra five francs are channeled into the pockets of Mr. Protectionist, which benefits himself and his workers, the extra five francs "did not come down from the moon; [it These tradesmen who now have to pay fifteen francs for their iron have five francs less to spend on other things. Before the law was passed, they could buy the iron they needed and still have five francs left to buy other things. 93 After the law is passed they have only enough to buy the iron.
94
They cannot use it to buy some other manufacture, or perhaps a book.
95
There is another moral to the story aside from the fact that protectionism results in a negative-sum game, or what Bastiat calls a "dead loss."
96 It is the lesson Bastiat teaches in The Law. "There are people who think that plunder loses all its immorality as soon as it becomes legal."
97
But it does not. Mr. Protectionist has used the law to do what he could not do without committing a crime. He cannot stop Belgian iron sellers at the border with guns and he cannot prevent his fellow Frenchmen from buying Belgian iron by using force without committing a crime. But he can use the law to do it for him. Thus, for Bastiat, the law is "perverted."
98
V. ANTIDUMPING-A MODERN EXAMPLE
Protectionism involves both winners and losers. The winners are domestic producers, who stand to gain because foreign producers are prevented from selling their products on domestic markets at a price they would otherwise charge. Tariffs on the importation of foreign products raise 87 [Vol. 5 the price of those products, making them less competitive and making it easier for domestic producers to keep their prices at a higher level than would be possible in a free market, where foreign producers are able to compete on price. But there are also losers. The losers consist of just about everyone else, since protectionism causes prices to rise above the market price and causes some products to be totally unavailable, which forces consumers to be content with their second or third choice rather than their first choice. While one might argue that tariff rates have come down since 1999-which is partly true-not all tariff rates have come down. As tariffs have been reduced, domestic producers have shifted their attention to antidumping law-a different kind of protectionist tariff-which they have found to be a very effective tool to thwart foreign competition.
99
Antidumping laws 100 serve the same purpose today as they did in Bastiat's time. Such laws have been in existence in the U.S. since World War I, if not earlier. They punish foreign producers for selling their products on domestic markets for less than the cost of production or for a lower price than what they charge in their home markets. You might ask, "Why would anyone care?" After all, low prices are good for consumers, and in the case of steel and chemicals and other products that domestic producers purchase to turn into finished products-like automobiles- No. 108-429, § 2006 (a), 118 Stat. 2597 (2004 . It was passed in response to alleged predatory dumping by Germany during World War I. The law made it a crime to import foreign goods for less than the wholesale or actual market value. Since it was a criminal law, which had an intent requirement, it was difficult to obtain convictions. Thus, there was a (perceived) need for a civil statute that would lower the barrier to conviction. Knoll points out that there was only one (unsuccessful) prosecution under this act in the first 50 years of its existence. See Knoll, supra note 99, at 268 n. 22. The Antidumping Act of 1921 was a response to these difficulties. It established the rules and procedures used today to determine liability and penalties. The Antidumping Act of 1921, 19 U.S.C. § § 160-171, repealed by Pub. L. No. 96-39, § 106(a), 93 Stat. 193 (1979) .
